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Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in 
legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where 
one particular kind of transparency - the publication of legislative records - works to 
overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from 
legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014, and from 
23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased 
transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock 
or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help 
facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, 
lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments. 
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The literature on transparency and accountability in legislatures has made impressive 
progress in recent years, both in the study of domestic and international negotiation 
contexts. A number of important studies have shed light on the consequences of 
increased transparency in politics for the individual and collective behaviour of elected 
representatives (cf. Carey, 2008), as well as for negotiation processes and policy 
outcomes (e.g. Stasavage, 2004). Interesting results have also emerged regarding the 
effect of transparency in public policy-making for citizens’ perceptions (e.g. De Fine 
Licht, 2014), and for citizens’ behaviour and electoral engagement (cf. Fung et al., 2007; 
Lassen, 2005). 
However, this article challenges a prevailing conclusion from recent 
contributions to the debate: that a direct trade-off exists between transparency and 
efficiency in policy-making (e.g. Besley and Prat, 2006; Fox, 2007; Meade and Stasavage, 
2008; Naurin, 2007; Prat, 2005; Stasavage, 2004, 2007). We argue against this 
conclusion by presenting a model of government bargaining in the Council of the 
European Union (hereafter ‘the Council’), as well as empirical results from a dataset on 
Council decision-making from 1999 to 2014. We combine this analysis with in-depth 
interviews with 23 politicians and senior officials involved in government negotiations 
in Brussels. 
Contrary to a trade-off between transparency and efficiency, our analysis shows 
how legislative decision processes can benefit from one particular kind of transparency, 
namely the publication of votes and legislative decision records. We present a 
bargaining model where negotiators decide whether to accept, amend or reject a 
proposal in a regime with no public legislative records (‘light transparency’) compared 
to a regime where legislative records are made publicly available (‘regulated 
transparency’). Our conclusion is that, in an environment with light transparency, 
negotiators will have little information about the strength of policy positions of co-
negotiators, and hence may misinterpret their proposals for policy change. Such 
misinterpretations can result in rejection or further amendments of proposals, which 
may protract negotiations or, in a worst case, lead to bargaining failure. Conversely, 
environments with high transparency raise the reputational costs of commitments and 
hence increase credibility of policy signals. This in turn lowers the risk of negotiation 
failure and increases efficiency of decision processes as it screens out marginal 
3 
 
amendments. We find support for these conclusions in our empirical analysis and 
further substantiate the findings as our interviewees explain how formal recordings of 
member states’ positions affect the informal ‘culture of consensus’ which the Council 
has so famously operated within. 
 
Transparency and its consequences 
High levels of transparency in legislative politics are found to improve the relationship 
between citizens and elected politicians in a number of ways: Better access to 
information forces politicians to be responsive to their electorates (Alt & Lassen, 2006; 
Besley and Burgess, 2002; Stasavage, 2004), while voters are also more likely to engage 
and vote in elections when they feel they can hold politicians to account (Lassen, 2005).  
However, recent analyses have made it clear that transparency is not without its 
draw-backs. One significant finding is that closed-door decision-making may produce 
better policy by enabling legislators to discuss and make their policy choices without 
considerations about their individual performances and pressures from the public (e.g. 
Meade and Stasavage, 2008; Prat, 2005; Stasavage, 2004). For example, Stasavage 
(2003; 2004) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) specify conditions under which 
transparency can produce worse public policy outcomes than non-transparency, and 
result in polarization among representatives. Transparency in legislative decision-
making may also reveal information about decision-makers’ potential need for external 
consultation by lobbyists and experts. In the EU context, Naurin (2007) has shown that 
transparency reforms had a negative effect on representatives in the European Council, 
the meeting of EU Heads of Government, who feared that the negotiations between 
lobbyists and politicians would become public. Naurin concludes that publicity led to 
less efficient negotiations and fruitful side-deals, leading to limited improvements in 
policies. 
In addition to problems of inefficient policy outcomes, Putnam (1988) has taught 
us that transparency may even pose a problem to negotiators’ ability to reach 
agreement in the first place: Whereas decision-makers may be willing to consider a 
wide range of options for reaching agreement in a private negotiation setting (i.e. the 
‘win-set’ of policy options in the bargaining space is not empty), public scrutiny may 
narrow such options and leave negotiators with a more limited range of possible 
agreement outcomes. In fact, if negotiations with small win-sets are not kept secret, 
4 
 
they can be jeopardized by so called ‘public commitment strategies’ (Fearon, 1994; 
Schelling, 1960): In order to gain over-proportionally (or avoid that other actors gain 
over-proportionally) negotiators might commit themselves publicly to a negotiation 
position. The commitment increases the transaction costs of moving away from this 
negotiation position. So if more than one negotiator is using this strategy, the likelihood 
of negotiation failure increases as the additional costs of moving away from the 
committed position are cutting into the existing win-set. Hence, an increase in these 
self-induced costs might reduce an existing win-set with a variety of feasible 
equilibrium outcomes into an empty set where no solution is achievable.  
Adding to this literature, Stasavage (2004) investigates the implications of 
increased transparency in international organisations, and looks into the 
consequences of public scrutiny of decision-making in the EU Council; i.e. the same 
institution as in our analysis below. In his analysis, Stasavage presents a two-level 
model of negotiations between two government representatives where a) members of 
the public are uncertain about whether representatives share their views and b) 
representatives have private information about the minimal offer that the public of 
each side would find acceptable. Representatives are concerned about both policy and 
their public’s ex-post assessment of the probability that they are unbiased. As long as 
this reputational concern is sufficiently strong, he shows that transparency ensures 
representatives take into greater account their public’s preferred outcome, and that 
transparency increases the likelihood of posturing if the public perceives a risk of bias. 
‘Posturing’ refers to assuming an uncompromising position that increases the risk of 
negotiation failure, and hence falls into the category of public commitment strategies 
mentioned above. 
We do not downplay these and other negative consequences of transparency. 
Yet, in light of the empirical record and the peculiarities of Council negotiations – 
regular, fragmented across formations and with a large and diverse set of negotiators 
around the table - we argue that EU transparency rules have facilitated negotiations 
among government representatives. Rather than the odd and cheap public remark 
after a Council meeting, the publicity produced by the current transparency regime – 
in form of making legislative documents publicly available - has increased the 
reputational costs of reneging, predominantly among negotiators, rather than between 
negotiators and their public. In the model we present below, we concentrate especially 
on this particular feature and show how, in the absence of a regulated transparency 
regime, the risk of failure increases if negotiators perceive a heightened risk of 
pretension by their colleagues, as it may be the case in an enlarged EU. The pinning 
down of these positions on a public record may make this behaviour less probable. 
Finally, we show how a regulated transparency regime can even increase decision-
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making efficiency by screening out marginal amendments.  
 
Transparency in the Council of the EU  
The arguments that high levels of transparency will affect content as well as policy 
processes are commonly heard in Council circles: EU negotiations are a two-level game 
where decision-makers need to accommodate national preferences with overall EU 
policy ambitions for improvements to a wider ‘good’. This requires deliberation and 
flexibility, which may be compromised if all details of negotiations are revealed, the 
argument goes (e.g. European Court of Justice, Case C-280/11 P 2013; Kleine, 2013). 
Nevertheless, recent decisions to release more detailed transcripts from Council 
meetings show that the ring-fencing of legislative negotiations between the ministers 
is no longer as strongly defended as in previous years (cf. Hildebrandt et al., 
2014;Naurin and Wallace, 2008). The Council, and the EU institutions in general, pride 
themselves of a detailed and extensive set of transparency policies, with great 
emphasis on public access to documents (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 
2006; 2015). However, while accessibility to documents is indeed impressive 
compared to many national legislatures, in reality governments have many 
opportunities to ‘filter’ the information that is released to the public. Cross and Bølstad 
(2015) show how this has developed during the years 1999-2009: With the 
implementation of new transparency regulation in 2001 (Regulation (EC) 1049/2001), 
the Council saw a sharp increase in the release – and in the timeliness of releases - of 
policy records. Nevertheless, not all legislative records are made publicly available, or 
may only be partially released, if governments deem it necessary for safe-guarding 
national interests or the policy process (Article 4). Cross and Bølstad therefore 
conclude that transparency in the Council has increased significantly since 1999, yet 
many details are still withheld, especially in legislation adopted in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 Central- and Eastern enlargements.  
A frequent explanation by senior officials in the Council is that the lack of detail in 
the public documents merely reflects that EU decision-making is a complicated matter. 
A Council chairperson has a great responsibility in keeping final negotiations in line 
with decision rules1 while taking into account the full list of agenda items and all 
preparatory work included in documents from the various working groups, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. A trend towards greater 
formalisation of Council meetings, and more detailed recording of member state 
positions, has been reported as a reaction to this complexity of the negotiation process, 
in particular as the expansion of membership added to the web of interactions 
(General Secretariat of the EU Council, 2009; 2015; Hagemann and de Clerk-Sachsse, 
2007).  
But what are the consequences of this increased use of legislative decision records in 
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the Council, and should we accept the suggestion from the literature that such 
increased levels of transparency come at the expense of decision-making efficiency? 
These are important questions to answer as pressures continue to grow for increased 
transparency in EU policy-making. The aim of the next section is hence to see the 
Council negotiations through the lens of a formal bargaining model in order to address 
the two most contested questions in the literature: a) transparency’s effect on 
negotiators’ ability to reach agreements; and b) transparency’s effect on the duration 
of negotiation processes.  
The intuition in our model is that governments negotiate in a sequential manner, 
where one government can introduce an amendment to a proposal, which other 
governments will then have to consider. The problem for the other governments is that 
they do not have any possibility of knowing what lies behind the proposed amendment 
if this is done in a secretive negotiation round (we refer to this as ‘light transparency’). 
Moreover, they do not know what the consequences are if they refuse a proposal that 
is not in their interest – will it lead to a negotiation failure, or will the proposer give in 
as they also have an interest in seeing policy adopted? In a second step we hence show 
how this uncertainty can be overcome by introducing one specific kind of 
transparency: the decision to publish legislative decision records where governments’ 
positions are recorded (referred to as ‘regulated transparency’), and decision-makers 
hence know that they can be held accountable for their policy positions. 
 
Uncertainty in Council negotiations and transparency as costly signal 
Suppose there is a proposal on the negotiating table of the Council2 and one 
government (or a coalition of governments)3 has to decide whether to propose an 
amendment. This government‘s support for the proposal is a necessary condition for 
the adoption of the measure, and the government can be of two types: strong or weak.4 
A strong government will vote against the bill if its amendment is rejected and, 
therefore, its vote will preclude the adoption of the proposal. A weak government will 
support the bill even if its amendment is rejected. The group of receiving governments 
is treated as a unitary collective actor which must decide whether to accept the 
amendment (for a similar approach see Schneider and Cederman, 1994). 
If the amendment is accepted, the payoff is 𝑎𝑖 , where 𝑖 = 1,2  are the proposing 
and receiving governments, respectively. When the receiving governments reject the 
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amendment from a strong proposer, we have a negotiation failure and payoffs are zero. 
If instead a weak proposer’s amendment is rejected, the payoff is 𝑟𝑖. Finally, the 
receiving governments and weak proposer get 𝑟𝑖 also if no amendment is tabled. A 
strong proposer gets zero in this circumstance. The preference ordering for the 
receiving governments is 𝑟2  >  𝑎2 > 0. Rejecting the amendment is better than 
accepting it, but acceptance is preferred to a negotiation failure. For the proposing 
government, the preference ordering is 𝑎1  >  𝑟1 > 0.  Acceptance is preferred to 
rejection, which yields 𝑟1 for the weak type and zero to the strong type.  
The proposing government pays a small cost, 𝑑 < 𝑎1 − 𝑟1, for drafting and 
tabling the amendment. It also has the opportunity of making its position public, under 
different transparency regimes. In a light regime, it can simply communicate its 
position to the public, with no official documents produced. In a more regulated 
environment, its position is reported in official legislative records. If the government is 
strong, this communication is costless, regardless of the transparency regime in force. 
A weak government may go public in order to try to pass as strong, but it comes with a 
commonly known reputational cost 𝑐, which is determined by the transparency 
regime. The reputational cost is related to the fact that a weak government would 
accept a proposal even if its amendment is rejected. 
Let 𝑝 denote the commonly known probability that the proposing government is 
weak. The proposing government decides whether to amend and, if it is the weak type, 
whether to go public at a cost, c. If an amendment is tabled, the receiving governments 
decide whether to accept it, without knowing the actual type of the proposing 
government and observing only its attitude toward publicity. The sequence of moves is 















Figure 1. A game of Council negotiations with uncertainty about the proposer and transparency 
as costly signal. 
We solve the model by backward induction and find the following perfect Bayesian 
equilibria (these are also sequential equilibria that survive the intuitive and divinity 
criteria, see the online appendix on model refinements. We disregard knife-edge 
equilibria where prior and posterior beliefs coincide). 
Light transparency and few weak proposers 
Consider the case where the transparency regime is light. The proposing government 
can simply issue a public statement but no official document is produced. The 
reputational cost for going public is small ( 𝑐 < 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑) and a weak government 
may decide to go public in order to pretend to be strong. However, for this strategy to 
succeed and this pooling equilibrium to materialize, the probability of a weak 
government has to be sufficiently small. Otherwise, the other governments would find it 
optimal to reject amendments randomly, and then the weak government will not find it 
optimal to propose amendments. The condition for a pooling equilibrium is 𝑝 < 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄ . 
This threshold increases with the acceptance payoff and diminishes with the rejection 
payoff of receiving governments. If the amended and the original proposals yield similar 
payoffs, receiving governments accept amendments even when it is highly likely that 
they come from a weak proposer. As these payoffs differ, the probability that it comes 
from a weak proposer must decrease for the amendment to be accepted. 
The strategies are 
𝑎1 − 𝑑,𝑎2 
Amend 



















Do not amend Nature sets 
government type 
weak 
( p ) 
Government 
strong 
(1- p ) 
Government 
Do not amend 
−𝑑, 0 
𝑟1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐, 𝑟2 
𝑎1 − 𝑑, 𝑎2 
𝑎1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐,𝑎2 
𝑟1 − 𝑑, 𝑟2 
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1. Both types of governments propose amendments and the weak proposer goes 
public. 
2. If the receiving governments see an amendment and publicity, they accept the 
amendment. If they see an amendment without publicity, they reject the 
amendment. 
Given the strategy at point 1, the receiving governments cannot infer anything by the 
publicity. Thus, their expected payoff from rejecting an amendment is 𝑟2𝑝 , and their 
expected payoff for accepting it is 𝑎2. Since  𝑝 < 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄ , it is optimal for the receiving 
governments to accept the amendment. It is sufficiently likely that the rejection of a 
randomly chosen amendment will end up in a negotiation failure, because the 
proponent is strong, that the receiving governments are better off accepting the 
amendments. Moreover, a weak government can successfully go public and pretend to 
be strong. Given the strategy of point 2, a weak government gets (𝑎1  − 𝑑 −  𝑐) if it 
proposes an amendment and goes public, 𝑟1 if it does not amend and (𝑟1 − 𝑑) if it 
amends and stays private. Not proposing is better than proposing without signalling. 
Moreover, since ( 𝑐 < 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑), proposing and signalling is the optimal strategy. 
From this equilibrium, we can derive two implications about the likelihood of 
amendment and the risk of negotiation failure. Both types of proposer always amend 5 
and negotiations never fail. A negotiation fails if the receiving governments reject an 
amendment from a strong proposer. This however never happens because the receiving 
governments accept any amendment with publicity (and a strong type goes always 
public). The risk of negotiation failure is therefore nil. 
Light transparency and many weak proposers 
Consider now a regime with light transparency (𝑐 < 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑) and a sufficiently high 
probability of a weak government, that is, 𝑝 > 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄ . Pooling cannot last. The 
probability of a weak government is so high that if both types were proposing 
amendments and were going public, it would be optimal for the receiving governments 
to reject always. A weak government would then obtain (𝑟1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐) and would be 
better off not proposing amendments since the payoff is 𝑟1. 
However, it would not be optimal for a weak proposer never to amend as well. In 
such separating equilibrium (discussed below), the receiving governments accept an 
amendment with publicity. A weak government would therefore find it optimal to 
propose an amendment and to go public since it would gain (𝑎1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐) rather than 𝑟1. 
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This government would then successfully pretend to be strong and the separating 
equilibrium would collapse. In other words, it is not optimal for the weak government 
never to amend and go public, nor always to do so. This semi-separating equilibrium 
then involves mixing strategies as follows: 
1. A weak government proposes amendments and goes public with probability 𝑠. 
2. The receiving governments reject an amendment, associated with publicity, with 
probability 𝑞 (and always reject amendments without publicity) 
A mixed strategy equilibrium requires 𝑠 =
𝑎2(1−𝑝)
𝑝(𝑟2−𝑎2)




If the receiving governments observe publicity of the proposing government, they 
recalculate the probability of a weak type, conditioned on publicity. This equals to 
𝑝𝑠
1−𝑝+𝑝𝑠




expected utility from rejecting the amendment is 
𝑟2𝑝𝑠
1−𝑝+𝑝𝑠
. The expected utility from 
accepting the amendment is 𝑎2. If the receiving governments are to follow a mixed 
strategy, the expected utilities from rejecting and accepting are identical, that is 
𝑟2𝑝𝑠
1−𝑝+𝑝𝑠
= 𝑎2. In other words, 𝑠 =
𝑎2(1−𝑝)
𝑝(𝑟2−𝑎2)
. Next, given the receiving governments’ 
strategy, the expected payoff of proposing amendments and going public for a weak 
type is [𝑎1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 − 𝑞(𝑎1 − 𝑟1)]. If this type is to mix strategy, this expected utility must 
be equal to 𝑟1, the payoff for not amending, which is preferred to amending without 




Consider now the implications for the likelihood of amendment and the risk of 
negotiation failure. Since 𝑝 > 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄ , 𝑠 is lower than one. Differently from the pooling 
equilibrium, a weak government does not always amend and go public. Moreover, the 
probability 𝑠 that this government proposes an amendment decreases if weak types are 
more likely (if 𝑝 increases) and if the receiving government’s rejection payoff 𝑟2 
increases. 
Recall that a negotiation fails if the receiving governments reject an amendment 
from a strong proposer. In this regime, the risk of negotiation failure is [𝑞( 1 − 𝑝)], that 
is the probability of receiving governments rejecting an amendment times the 





 (1 − 𝑝). It increases if strong types are more likely, if the drafting and 
signalling costs decrease and as the proposer’s acceptance payoff increases relative to 
the rejection payoff. As long as 𝑝 > 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄ , failure is more likely as the pool of strong 
proposers that benefit significantly from an amendment increases. 
Since a strong government now faces a positive probability of rejection, its 
expected utility of proposing amendments is [𝑎1(1 − 𝑞) − 𝑑]. In the equilibrium 
discussed above with few weak proposers, the payoff from amending is (𝑎1 − 𝑑). This 
means that the belief of many weak proposers produces a negative externality for 
strong proposers. Their expected utility from amending decreases by 𝑎1𝑞. Given the 
equilibrium value of 𝑞, this utility loss increases with the proposer’s acceptance payoff 
and it decreases as the drafting and signalling costs and the proposer’s rejection payoff 
increase. Governments that have high stakes in making sure that their amendments are 
included in the proposal have therefore an incentive to move away from this regime.  
Regulated transparency 
Consider now a more regulated regime where governments do not just simply make 
their views public, but their positions are reported in official legislative records. These 
records increase reputational costs and make it harder for weak governments to 
pretend to be strong. If the reputational cost is high enough, then publicity serves to 
separate the weak from the strong type of government because it will not be optimal for 
the former to pay this cost. The receiving governments will correctly infer that the 
proposing government is strong and they will accept its amendment. The condition for 
this separating equilibrium is 𝑐 > 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑. 
The strategies are 
1. A government proposes and goes public if and only if it is strong (a weak 
government never goes public). 
2. If the receiving governments see an amendment and publicity, they infer that the 
proposer is strong and they accept the amendment. If they see an amendment 
without publicity, they infer that the proposer is weak and they reject the 
amendment. 
To verify this equilibrium, given the proposing government’s strategy at point 1, the 
receiving governments correctly infer that publicity indicates strength and lack thereof 
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indicates weakness. They are better off rejecting an amendment from a weak 
government because 𝑟2  >  𝑎2, and accepting an amendment from a strong government 
because 𝑎2  > 0. The actions at point 2 are therefore optimal, given the proposing 
government’s behaviour at point 1. Conversely, given this strategy of the receiving 
governments, a weak government gains (𝑎1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐) if it proposes an amendment and 
goes public, (𝑟1 − 𝑑) if it amends and stays private and 𝑟1 if it does not amend. Since 
𝑐 > 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑 and 𝑑 > 0, a weak proposer does not amend. For a strong government, 
it is always optimal to amend since it gains a payoff of (𝑎1 − 𝑑) versus nil for not 
amending. 
In this regime, the probability of amendment is (1 − 𝑝) since only the strong 
proposer amends. Moreover, negotiations never fail. Recall that failure occurs if the 
receiving governments reject an amendment from a strong proposer. This never 
happens because the receiving governments accept any amendment with publicity (and 
a strong type goes always public). Receiving governments would accept an amendment 
even if the drafting cost is zero (here, the acceptance payoff for a strong government is 
even higher). The risk of negotiation failure is therefore nil. 
 
Probability of amendment and risk of negotiation failure 
Table 1 summarizes the results with regard to the probability of amendment6 and the 
risk of negotiation failure. The regulated transparency regime displays a lower 
probability of amendment than the light transparency regime. In a light regime, 
amendment is less likely if there are many weak proposers because the receiving 
governments are more likely to reject. In this latter case, the probability of amendment 
increases if strong types are more likely and if the receiving government’s rejection 
payoff 𝑟2 decreases. Finally, the risk of negotiating failure is higher than zero only in a 
light regime with many weak proposers. 
Table 1. Probability of amendment and risk of negotiation failure under different 
transparency regimes. 
 Light transparency 




𝑐 > 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑 
 Few weak proposers 
𝑝 < 𝑎2 𝑟2⁄  
Many weak proposers 











) (1 − 𝑝)  
1 − 𝑝 
 




𝑎1 − 𝑟1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐
𝑎1 − 𝑟1





Applying our conclusions from the model to the Council context we formulate three 
hypotheses. First, we expect the legislative records to have an effect on the level of 
information available to negotiators. Reneging on officially recorded positions is more 
costly. Therefore, this regulated transparency environment is more informative since it 
facilitates the interpretation of policy signals. In other words, access to legislative 
records reduces uncertainty about government positions (H1). Second, when negotiators 
believe that incentives for pretending are heightened as it could be in a larger and more 
variegated Council, access to legislative records decreases the risk of negotiation failure 
(H2) (compare the third and last column in Table 1).  Lastly, access to legislative records 
reduces the duration of negotiation processes (H3) as marginal proposals are screened 
out from the ‘weak’ government types described above. 
These expectations are with reference to the reputational cost 𝑐, determining the 
transparency regime, and the probability 𝑝 of a weak government. They therefore 
assume constant payoffs. This assumption is acceptable in the broader empirical 
investigation that follows, but a straightforward implication from relaxing it is that the 
risk of failure increases with the intensity of conflict among governments. 7 We will 
show that this consideration illuminates at least one finding. 
We investigate our hypotheses by presenting results from an original dataset 
covering legislative activities in the Council from 1999 to 2014. We also draw on 
interview material with 23 ministers and senior civil servants from the Council, its 
secretariat in Brussels and the national representations of the Member States. Our 
choice of research methods is rooted in the complex policy environment in the Council, 
and we immediately concede on an issue: During the years covered by our analysis, the 
Council has almost doubled in size and a number factors are known to have affected 
policy-making. Especially the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the Eurozone crisis and 
the Lisbon Treaty are likely to have intervening effects on the issues we investigate 
here. Also changing legislative and administrative priorities for the Commission and 
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changes to the Council’s internal rules of procedure are of importance. Hence, it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of increased transparency from that of other, 
simultaneous, changes. For that reason, the analysis that follows is not a test of our 
hypotheses in the traditional sense, but is rather a probability probe of the expectations 
derived from the model in contrast to the arguments made in much of the existing 
literature: that increased transparency comes at the expense of efficiency in policy-
making. We therefore use our quantitative material to get a descriptive and broad 
picture of developments, combined with an extensive qualitative investigation where 
we ask the practitioners themselves about their observations regarding the use of 
public legislative records. This approach has proven extremely informative and 
particularly useful granted our outset in a formal bargaining model.8  The mix of 
research methods also leave us confident in arguing that if any of our suggested effects 
are observable, they should be even more resilient when considered in combination 
with possible effects from these other significant developments that have taken place. 
For example, if governments’ ability to reach agreements has not significantly dropped 
nor negotiations considerably prolonged with the introduction of the above 
transparency changes, while the Council at the same time has enlarged from 15 to 25-
27 member states, then this would lend support to our hypotheses and suggest that 
the prevailing wisdom from the literature should be reconsidered.  
The empirical analysis is divided into two sections, with a first section on 
‘Probability of agreement’ which addresses hypotheses 1 and 2. The second section, 
‘Duration of negotiations’ refers back to hypothesis 3.  
 
Probability of agreement 
Three major ‘events’ are relevant to investigate when we seek evidence for whether 
or not access to legislative decision records can help overcome problems of 
asymmetric information and affect governments’ ability to come to agreement on 
policies: 1) Council decision records became electronically available from 1999; 2) in 
2001 Regulation 1049/2001 came into effect regarding increased public access to EU 
records; and 3) the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. The Lisbon 
Treaty is perceived to increase transparency in the Council through its Article 16.8, 
which calls for public deliberation and decision records when the Council acts in a 
legislative capacity (General Secretariat of the Council 2009, Article 5). It is also 
thought to have put pressure on the Council with regards to the recording of 
legislative activities due to the increase in policy areas that fall under the OLP, where 
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the Council decides on legislation in cooperation with the Parliament. 
In the first instance we look at the level of legislative activity in the Council.  Figure 
2 below shows the total amount of legislation adopted each year since 1999. From the 
figure it is clear that the volume of legislation has fluctuated quite significantly during 
the past 15 years. Interestingly, it appears as if this fluctuation may be affected by the 
electoral cycle of the Parliament and Commission as peaks can be detected around 
1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014. However, important to our analysis, none of the 
increases and decreases in the figure appears to correspond with the introduction of 
new transparency rules. Even Regulation 1049/2001 in December 2001 did not 
result in a decrease in legislative activity. Instead, significant decreases appear after 
the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, and with a substantial, longer-lasting decrease 
again after the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (December 2009) (perhaps also as a 
reaction to the prolonged Eurozone crisis). 
 
 
Figure 2 also shows that while the total amount of legislation has fluctuated over the 
years, the percentage adopted under OLP has markedly increased. Again, this is 
particularly the case just after May 2004, and then again in the years since Lisbon was 
implemented. Since 2009, close to 80% of legislation has been adopted under this 
procedure, and in the last two years this has further increased to around 85%. 
While the amount of legislation has fluctuated, Figure 2 on the other hand suggests 
that the percentage of legislation adopted with recorded contestation in the Council 





















































































favour of a given proposal. However, a larger percentage of policies have governments 
who either vote ‘No’ or ‘Abstain’ than previously. In the first 4 years, the percentage of 
legislation with recorded no votes or abstentions was at an average of about 16%. In 
the last 4 years, the level has been close to 35%9. Nevertheless, when opposition is 
recorded on a proposal, it is still usually a small number of Member States who are 
found to be in opposition. Groups are currently on average between three to five 
countries, while before the enlargement it was only a single or up to three countries in 
opposition. 
The short grey line in Figure 2 further shows how Member States have made use of 
‘formal statements’ in Council decision-making in the last four years. These are policy 
statements that governments can include in the Council minutes when a proposal has 
been adopted and voted on. They are used to clarify a position, and range from 
statements which elaborate on the reasons behind a government’s support or 
opposition in votes, or they may show severe disagreement with a decision although 
the government may have chosen not to oppose the proposal through voting 
(Hagemann et al., 2015). Interestingly, Figure 2 therefore shows that, while opposition 
in voting has increased since enlargement, the use of formal statements is also 
significant: for example, Member State governments submitted policy statements on 
24% of legislation in 2009, while this increased to approximately 38% in 2013 and 
2014. Also, as with the votes, the policy statements show that it is increasingly groups 
of Member States, and not just individual countries, who decide to include their 
positions in the records.  
All of this suggests that the Council has indeed undergone significant changes in its 
legislative activity during the 15-year time period investigated here, when important 
changes have been introduced to the ways legislative decisions are recorded and made 
public. At first that could seem to question our hypothesis 2. However, the yearly 
variation in the data indicates that the drops in policy agreements do not follow from 
new transparency initiatives (in 1999, 2001 and 2009), but rather seem to be reactions 
mainly to the 2004 enlargement and the Lisbon Treaty (possibly combined with the 
economic crisis). This is further clarified in our interviews. When asked about these 
trends, none of the senior civil servants from the Council secretariat and permanent 
representations attributed the fluctuations in legislative activity with greater public 
access to Council records. One interviewee pointed out that ‘. . . so many important 
developments happened during those years [. . .] especially enlargement and the 
Lisbon Treaty’s additional powers to the European Parliament explain some of these 
changes’ (Interview 10). Several interviewees also emphasised that the figures depend 
on the Commission and the political and economic environment. But none of them 
thought that the policy agenda and the overall figures are affected by decisions to 
publish legislative records. One person explained that: 
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‘. . . a lot of the legislation that is negotiated in the Council is rather 
technical, but even when decisions are of great importance to the 
governments, I have never experienced that negotiations broke down 
due to procedural rules about how things are minuted or recorded. . . . 
In some cases there may of course be a request [from governments] to 
withhold information from the records, but there are rules for that . . . I 
do think that there is more awareness of how governments negotiate 
and things are recorded, but I don’t think it results in legislation not 
going through.’ (Interview 4). 
 
However, an important detail became clear when we asked about differences with 
regards to legislation adopted under the unanimity rule compared to qualified 
majority decisions (QMV). The high increase in the proportion of legislation adopted 
under the OLP was entirely attributed to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (cf. 
Figure 2). Yet, when asked about whether public records have made it harder to meet 
the unanimity rule when required, several interviewees suggested this would depend 
on the importance of the proposal. Many representatives still make use of the option of 
‘constructive abstention’ when it comes to unanimity, it was explained, but if policies 
are of importance to a government and their position will be publicly recorded, then 
unanimity may be more difficult to reach. Conversely, recordings of government 
positions were pointed out to not be problematic under QMV. Governments were said 
to now be more readily inclined to either vote against, abstain or state their opposition 
in a statement if they found it ‘useful’ (e.g. Interviews 5; 9; 10; 17; 20). A number of 
interviewees also suggested that this increase in publicly recorded positions reflect 
increased contestation in the Council, mainly due to the fact that there are so many 
more interests to accommodate.  
However, when asked the specific question ‘if and how the recording of votes and 
policy statements impact on meetings’, the interviewees all conclude that the more 
formal and ‘strict’ format was essential to steer negotiations. Although arguments 
varied regarding the ways in which making these records available to the public had an 
effect on specific policy negotiations, all interviewees pointed out that public records – 
including access to negotiation partners’ positions on previous and current legislation– 
in general make information more readily available between representatives. One 
representative explained how formal recordings of legislative agreements result in a 
more ‘diligent exchange of views’ with ‘a lot of attention to detail as we know that 
things are written down and we may have to explain [our government’s] position 
later’. This, in turn, also means that other countries’ representatives are ‘in the same 
situation, so we are all aware that each of us have to be able to go back home and say 
what was agreed and what our position has been’ (Interview 9). 
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In sum, none of our interviewees indicated that the increased public access to 
legislative decision records - and the gradual increase of information provided in 
those documents – in general has had a negative effect on governments’ ability to 
agree on policies in the Council. Neither the data nor the interview material supports 
such assertions, which is what we should have concluded according to much of the 
recent literature. However, the details provided by the interviewees suggest that we 
may need to make a distinction between policies adopted by QMV and cases where 
legislation is adopted by unanimity and is of very high importance to the 
governments. This relates back to the insights from the literature we discussed in the 
beginning of the paper, in particular with regards to its conclusions regarding 
incentives for public pandering and decision-making where no policy win-set is 
available from the outset: when governments have quite different views, policies are 
of great salience, each negotiator has a veto, and the public is watching, then 
recordings in legislative decision records may lead to a stand-off between negotiators 
which cannot be reconciled. In light of our model, this resembles a situation where 
the risk of failure increases as the intensity of conflict among governments becomes 
more severe. However, in the overwhelming majority of cases in the Council this is 
not the case. More than 85% of legislation is now decided by QMV, it is most cases of a 
less salient or technical nature, and the interviewees have made it clear that, in 
general, decision records do not act as a hindrance for governments to come to 
agreement. They rather appear to facilitate information and decrease uncertainty 
between decision-makers (H1), and enable governments to more readily understand 
positions of cooperation partners when seeking to reach agreements (H2). 
 
Duration of negotiations  
Our hypothesis 3 stated that the duration of negotiation processes will decrease if 
legislative decision records in the Council are released to the public. This follows from 
our model since the introduction of legislative records will make it possible to 
distinguish between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ governments, and to screen out marginal 
proposals from ‘weak’ proposers.  However, in our empirical investigation there may, 
again, be a number of interfering factors – such as an inter-institutional agreement to 
seek adoption of legislation at the first reading stage – which makes it difficult to 
attribute any shortening of the decision process solely to increased transparency in 
the legislative records. We therefore pay close attention to such possible confounding 
factors in what follows. 
Official data from the European Parliament (2014) shows that during the years 
1999-2014 there has been a significant decrease in the time it takes from the 
presentation of a policy proposal by the Commission until it is finally adopted in the 
Council: From 1999 to 2004 the legislative process took on average 24 months, from 
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2004 to 2009 it was 22 months, while the process further decreased to 17 months 
during 2009-2014.10 
Our interview material makes it clear that it is indeed difficult to attribute this 
decline directly to the publication of Council decision records. Hence, while we note 
that the decrease in negotiation time contradicts the premise from the literature that 
public access to Council decision records would stall – or considerably prolong - 
policy processes, we need to rely on the insights from the practitioners regarding 
whether and to what degree we should at all consider the length of policy processes 
as linked to the public recording of Council members’ decisions.  
As discussed above, the interviews make it clear that formal recordings of decision-
makers’ positions have become increasingly important in keeping track of every 
government’s stand point, and also in letting groups of governments find each other 
on policy proposals where they expect to have similar interests. That in itself seems 
to be of value in the complex processes. ‘Decision records and minutes make it easier 
to get an overview of specific concerns we need to be aware of, but also how the 
negotiations are likely to develop. [. . . ] we can prepare and know where things stand 
at a next meeting.’ (Interview 20). Still, the representatives in some cases made it 
clear that there are instances where the public recording of positions also serves the 
governments’ need for ‘signalling’ to home audiences that they have fought for a 
specific cause. Like in our theory discussion, we readily concede that such signals to 
external actors may at times affect decision processes or the governments’ ability to 
reach an agreement. Yet, these cases do not appear to dominate negotiations, and 
interviewees in several instances stressed the importance of having clear positions 
and credible information about where everyone stands on individual pieces of 
legislation, and also in the various policy areas more broadly: ‘if our government is on 
public record that they will support some proposal, then we of course also consider 
that same position on a similar proposal later on.’ (Interview 16). 
Figure 3 below elaborates on this point as it highlights the great difference in 
governments’ inclination to oppose or abstain in the Council (labelled together as 
‘contested votes’). The data is here grouped together into three periods to mark the 
significant changes brought about with the 2004 enlargement and the Lisbon Treaty 
(i.e. January 1999-April 2004; May 2004-November 2009; December 2009-December 
2014. For the last period, we have also included the number of recorded policy 
statements per country). Especially UK, Germany, Denmark can be found to either 
oppose through votes or make their concerns known in the formal statements in all 
three periods covered by the figure. The Netherlands, Poland and Austria also have 
relative high numbers of policies where they record their positions vis-a-vis the 
majority. Other countries - notably France in the last period - do rarely if ever oppose 
the majority in voting, although they also make use of the statements following the 
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The data hence show that even large and powerful countries find themselves ‘out voted’ 
in the Council. In fact, the data suggest that larger (and Northern) countries are more 
frequently in the minority when voting than smaller states. A whole literature has 
devoted itself to explain these findings (cf. Bailer et al., 2014). But important to our 
analysis are the explanations from our interviews regarding how these patterns have 
changed over time: As the Council expanded and diversified its members in the 2000s, 
and as the political agenda has developed since then, the procedures and culture of 
decision-making have also undergone changes from an explicit ‘consensus’-driven 
approach, to one where formal decision rules and procedures of meetings are more 
emphasised (cf. Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007; Naurin and Wallace 2008). 
Today, ‘…there is a great ambition of accommodating everyone’s interests, but we know 
that when a majority is found, the proposal can be adopted, so we will try to be on board 
as much as possible’ (Interview 17). In fact, several interviewees explained there’s a 




























































































































































Figure 3. Contested votes and policy statements in the EU Council. 
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that proposals are adopted when the Chair assesses that a sufficient number of 
countries support a text: ‘… if a country - or small number of our partners – cannot 
support the text, they are invited to minute their reservations [….] they can record their 
positions as the proposal is passed’ (Interview 9). The change towards a more ‘rule 
based’-decision-making may hence explain the increased level of recorded policy 
positions. It also speaks in favour of our third hypothesis that access to legislative 
records reduces the duration of negotiation processes. The use of public records appear 
to be a tool for ensuring more ‘disciplined’ negotiations amongst decision-makers, both 
with regards to confirmation of policy positions (as they are formally recorded and 
hence come with a cost) and with regards to more readily adopting policy once a 
sufficient majority is in place. 
 
Conclusion 
Legislative transparency is a contested topic in any political system, and academic 
research has found mixed results regarding the benefits and drawbacks of making 
decision- makers’ political records public. 
In the EU Council, governments’ decision records have been available to the public 
for some time. However, these public documents have been far from complete in terms 
of providing details regarding the policy content of an adopted proposal, as well as 
regarding individual legislators’ positions on these proposals. Nevertheless, a general 
trend is noticeable towards including more information in the Council’s public records. 
We argue that making EU members’ legislative records public does not come as a 
direct trade-off with the efficiency of policy processes. While some of the literature has 
concluded that transparency decreases the efficiency of decision processes, we 
conclude that the implications require a more nuanced consideration: Our model 
shows how public access to legislative records can help overcome problems of 
incomplete information, which in turn can reduce the risk of negotiation failure and 
increase the efficiency of decision-making. 
We have stressed throughout our analysis that a number of other significant 
changes have happened to the EU policy processes in parallel to increasing the public’s 
access to legislative decision records. We have therefore had to consider the likely 
intervening implications of these developments in our empirical observations. Still, we 
would like to stress that as several of our suggested effects are observable, they should 
be even more resilient when considered in combination with possible effects from 
these events. In particular, as governments’ ability to reach agreements has not been 
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significantly hampered with the introduction of the above transparency changes, while 
the Council at the same time has enlarged from 15 to 25-27 Member States (during the 
time period investigated here), this lends support to our hypotheses that making 
legislative decision records available to the public does not negatively affect 
governments’ ability to reach agreement on policies. We also find support for the other 
propositions derived from our model that making legislative decision records available 
to the public helps overcome problems of incomplete information, and can help 
decrease the length of negotiation processes. Both our data and interview material 
speak to that effect. Hence, in sum, we find that transparency may have several 
implications for the policy process, but most importantly we provide evidence that 





                                                             
1. Unanimity is applied to certain matters affecting the members’ fundamental sovereignty whereas other 
decisions are taken by either a simple or qualified majority (QMV) system. In most cases, the Council 
votes on issues by a qualified majority rule, meaning that there must be a minimum of 55% of the 
member states in favour, comprising at least 15 of them, and representing at least 65% of the population 
(Treaty on European Union, Article 16). It should be noted that ‘abstentions’ hence have the effect of ‘No’ 
votes under the QMV rule as they count against the mobilisation of a majority for adopting a legislative 
proposal. 
2. We focus on negotiations between members of the Council, excluding the interactions with the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. Nevertheless, the point we make of how 
transparency reduces uncertainty could be extended to the interactions with the other institutions.  
3. Thus, the proposing actor can be a single government in unanimity or a blocking minority coalition of 
governments in qualified majority voting. 
4. The decision-making rule does not provide information about the type of proposing government or 
coalition. A government proposing an amendment under unanimity can be weak and one proposing an 
amendment under qualified majority can be strong.  
5. If we allow the drafting cost to exceed the threshold(𝑎1 − 𝑟1), we should add the following to point 1 of 
the equilibrium: a strong government amends if and only if𝑑 < 𝑎1, a weak government amends if and only 
if 𝑑 < 𝑎1 − 𝑟1 . If 𝑑 > 𝑎1, the drafting cost is too high for any amendment to be tabled. If 𝑎1 > 𝑑 > 𝑎1 − 𝑟1, 
only the strong type amends. This separating equilibrium is based on an implausibly high cost of drafting 
and it is less interesting because the cost does not vary across types. 
6. Let 𝑘 and 𝑗 be the probabilities that, respectively, a weak and a strong type proposes an amendment 
under a given regime. The probability of amendment in a regime is 𝑘𝑝 +  𝑗(1 − 𝑝). 
7. All else being equal, as (𝑎1 − 𝑟1) increases we are more likely to move to a light transparency scenario 
and as (𝑎2/𝑟2) decreases we are more likely to face a positive risk of failure (see Table 1). 
8. See Laitin (2003) on the use of qualitative and quantitative material in combination with formal 
models. 
9. Except in 2014, where it is clear from the data that the European elections and new Commission have 
had an effect on the legislative records. 
10. Unfortunately the dates for the introduction of legislation to the Council by the European Commission 
is not covered by our dataset for the years 1999-2004, so we are not able to confirm this conclusion for 
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